Cloning at Apple Computer


Several years ago, Gill Amelio, then CEO of Apple Computer, decided to license the Macintosh operating system (OS) to other companies. To him, licensing made sense because Apple could not cover every market niche by itself, but a group of computer makers could. However, the plan had one fatal flaw, the OS was licensed to big companies that had their own agendas. So, instead of covering the unprofitable margins of the Macintosh market, the cloners chose to concentrate on the most profitable niches, Apple’s core markets. By licensing the Mac OS to these firms, Apple created a group of dangerous competitors. Naturally, the cloning program collapsed. Part of the problem was that Apple chose the wrong partners. Big corporations tend to be arrogant and promote a certain kind of aggressive manager. Also, there might have been a cultural thing at work here too. How well could Mr. Amelio relate with those outside of his society?  Perhaps big corporations were the only kinds of businesses that Mr. Amelio felt comfortable with. However, choosing large firms as partners may not have been bad in itself. I think the best possible brand names on a Mac would have been either Dell, or Kenmore (think about the markets Apple is going after). But, the managers at Apple should have expected the cloners to be competitors. The problem was that Apple had to maintain control as manager of the Mac in order for cloning to work. But, this was not possible under the licensing agreements, because the cloners probably would have rejected any license agreement allowed this (but Sears or Walmart might have accepted such a license). Ultimately, the cloning program failed because the managers at Apple did not understand the economic paradigms of the computer business. Cloning seemed like a good idea to them (and it was), but they executed their strategy according to the ideology of the business school, not the natural rules of the marketplace. So, naturally, the market rewarded their efforts with failure. The underlying idea was good, but the execution was lousy. If Apple had done things differently, cloning might have worked.

Why Did Cloning Fail?
There are two economic paradigms directly at work in the computer business, the hardware paradigm and the software paradigm. The two paradigms conflict in essential ways. The software paradigm favors the infinitely flexible because software can emulate anything. So, for maximum software profits an infinite variety of machines should be available to fit every situation, each capable of running your software. This was the fundamental argument for cloning. On the other hand, the hardware paradigm is extremely rigid, and favors the highly standardized. So, for maximum hardware profits, there should only one standard computer, made by one maker, running one standard OS, with only standard applications. This was why cloning failed. The problem was that Apple could make money on software and lose money on hardware, or make money on hardware and lose money on software; but could not make money on both. And finally, the managers at Apple had to choose.

The OS Dilemmas
There are hidden choices in creating an operating system. Sometimes you can have one option, or another option, but not both or a mixture of the two. In creating and marketing an OS there are choices. You can have a standard machine that works really well in only a few environments running a proprietary OS (for example, Macintosh). Or, you can have a standard OS that runs moderately well on a multitude of machines, made by many manufacturers, and customized for many different work environments. But, you cannot have both. Understand, a proprietary OS can run very well because the manufacturer is able to design the hardware around it. A generic OS, like Windows, cannot anticipate all the possible variations in hardware and drivers, so problems are inevitable. Then, there are the economic realities. For a hardware company, manufacturing dozens of different kinds of computers is unprofitable, so the company tends to concentrate on a few models. That is why the proprietary OS’s are limited to a few market niches. For a software company generic OS’s are the thing because the market for proprietary OS’s is limited. Understand, Microsoft became a monopoly because they didn’t make hardware, and so were never limited to a few niches. Next, there is the issue of OS niches. Different applications require different things of an OS. A Unix machine is great for running web servers, but it requires a lot of knowledge on the part of the user. A Macintosh is very easy to set up and use because the machine and the OS are so integrated, but it is also more expensive. A Windows PC runs a generic OS, so the hardware is cheaper, but it can never be as stable as a Unix machine or as simple to use as a Macintosh. Everything is a trade off. It all depends on what you are doing. So, what would the Mac have become in a cloning environment? Possibly, a hermaphrodite OS. An OS that was neither fish not fowl, but had the problems of both. So, cloning the Mac might have created an unseen danger.

What Apple Should Have Done
If I had been advising Mr. Amelio, I would have proposed this: Sell mother boards, daughter cards, and toolkit ROMs (what BIOS is to the PC's, but done on much safer read only memory chips) to anyone along with the license to build one Macintosh Computer. Price the boards according to age, speed, and potential. So, the latest boards would have the largest markups, while the older boards would have lower markups; and the toolkits (what you need to build a laptop, high end workstation, or a server) would have the largest markups. Then, let the cloners make the Cadillacs and Porches (as well as the Yugos and Hyundais) of the Macintosh market. And have Apple concentrate on building the inner Mac, and perhaps making a few Buicks and Chevies; more to define a basic standard Mac than to make money. Since most of Apple's profits would come from selling the OS and circuit boards, letting the cloners (who have to buy the cards) have ninety percent of the Macintosh market would be no problem. And, this would have increased the Macintosh market share by opening up the custom computer market (currently Macs are limited to department store shelves and internet sales). Overall, this plan would have given Apple several advantages.

Of course there are drawbacks. Theoretically, Apple could make more money by selling whole computers. But, the desktop computer market is fiercely competitive. For example, some desktop computers are given away in return for internet service contracts. The money is in the OS, not the box. Also, this assumes that niche cloning cannot increase the Mac OS market share. Unfortunately, business thinking is still done in terms of smokestack era mass marketing. A computer is not a slinky, or a hula hoop, and cannot be marketed like one. Instead, a computer is something like a cross between an appliance (that can be mass marketed), and a personal musical instrument (that cannot be mass marketed). The trick is to work both sides of the marketing paradigm. What I propose can do that. Another drawback is fragmentation. A large number of manufacturers and models means that there will be many different configurations and possible hardware conflicts. However, making the boards would have put Apple in a position to limit the scope of possible conflicts (either through engineering or politics). And, if someone ever did try to make a really custom Mac, well the hardware conflicts wouldn’t be Apple’s problem. All in all, I think this plan might have given Apple the cloners it needed, and years of profits for it’s stock holders.

Finally
The unseen bugaboo in Apple’s cloning was the issue of choosing between conflicting strategies. Understand, corporate managers may not be aware of the paradoxes in their strategies because of the teachings of the business school. There is only supposed to be one set of rules for the entire economic system. And, one mass market for mass produced goods. So, economic paradigms cannot exist, and paradigm conflicts cannot happen. Many firms in the computer world are unknowingly caught up in these dilemmas. When Apple Computer decided to license the Mac OS, no one seemed to realize that the plan had to line up with the paradigms of the computer market. Or, that the paradigms would dictate the outcome of their strategy. In the end, Managers should be creative when dealing with paradigm conflicts.

I hope you enjoyed reading this.

For more on the paradigms behind the computer market see, What About Paradigms?.
For more on the culture of behind our economics, see An Un-economic Interlude.

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December 28, 1999 - July 10, 2000


Copyright © 2000 by George A. Fisher