Indonesia: At War with Planet Earth?? NO!(?)

Indonesia is in danger of ceasing to exist in any way related to what it was in June 1997. This has been true since May 1998, when the Indonesian government lost control of the capital Jakarta for 24+ hours due to rioting. Former President Suharto resigned shortly afterwards. Itar-Tass reported that the immediate reason given for the resignation was an apoplectic seizure. [Whatever that means to Itar-Tass: I have seen translation difficulties into English before. Itar-Tass has reported large snowstorms affecting Moscow as hurricanes, several times since 1996.]

The recent developments regarding East Timor have put Indonesia in danger of waging war with the United Nations. An index to the highly disrupting UN-mediated agreement is here.

This summary was written on September 30, 1999.

Habibie [Suharto's official successor] had insufficient political power to prevent a vote on the secession of East Timor from Indonesia. This vote was somewhen in early September. The pro-Indonesian militias went into mass-violence mode within hours.

• Actually, the violence is fairly normal. The American Civil War [1860-1865] was triggered by a similar vote to secede from the United States. However, the atrocities (such as physically verifiable mass graves for massacres, and direct destruction of infrastructure that the militias need to survive) are not normal.

As best as can be determined by studying MyCNN from the other side of the Earth, a de facto coup was executed on September 7, 1999. [At any rate, the rumors of the coup started then.] At this time, General Wiranto successfully removed Habibie from power. This was confirmed by diplomats in Jakarta on September 9, 1999.

However, part of this coup plan is that the former government structure stays intact, including Habibie's position as President. Indonesia is still refusing to formally acknowledge that the coup is real.

Australia moved next. When the question of a UN intervention force came up, Australia put 2,000 troops in Darwin on notice that they had to be able to leave for East Timor in four hours.

Australia's Maritime Union imposed a 100% shutdown of exports from Australia to East Timor about then: without coordinating with Australia. It was lifted after five days (and two days of pressure from the Australian government). Meanwhile, Kofi Annan [of the United Nations] was crafting "the peace force Indonesia cannot refuse". The Security Council proved compliant: the East Timor degeneration was more threatening to Red China than either Taiwan's insistence on negotiating being annexed by the mainland (thus ditching the One China doctrine, initially a U.S. invention), or the U.S. cruise missile perfectly targeting the Chinese Embassy. The last incident is surveyed at Eastern Orthodoxy, Evangelicals, Charismatics, etc..(among other places).

Many (if not most) Indonesians refer to the UN peacekeeping force as an Australian invasion force. This delusion (sorry, Indonesian readers) does have some basis:

• Australia has mentioned only one emergency evacuation plan for Australian nationals from Indonesia: military force. This was back in June or July 1998. Australia has been planning for an Indonesian invasion of Australia since June 1998. An Indonesian invasion pits 19 million Australians versus the fourth most populous country on Earth.
  • For example, there are clearly Australian nationals near "Indonesia's second city", which happens to have Indonesia's World Trade Center (and the Australian Trade offices). These Australian offices were vandalized recently [after September 20, 1999] by Indonesians outraged over the 100% export shutdown the Australian Maritime Union pulled off.
  • Jakarta is not exempt from these emergency evacuation plans.
• The Australian Prime Minister Howard has a serious PR problem: in a recent poll, 45% of Australians indicated that he was doing too little about East Timor. 10% indicated he was doing too much. In contrast, Thailand (and most other countries in ASEAN) are horrified by the insufficient action he had already authorized regarding East Timor. Howard is explicitly resisting political pressure: he wants to keep Australian troops out of East Timor, rather than the vastly more popular sending them in.
• The UN forces have been on "shoot to kill" orders since September 26 or so. They have captured somewhere between 10 and 15 Kopassus agents (the Indonesian version of a cross between commandos and Nazi SS Gestapo), and at least one platoon leader of a pro-Indonesian militia.
• October 2, 1999: I forgot to mention that circa September 15, 1999, the Australian National Broadcasting Company set up a network of radio broadcast stations so that they could cover the entire nation of Indonesia with news in both English and the main Indonesian language. This operation is exactly like Voice of America, which the U.S.A. did to the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War.

While U.S. President Clinton has adroitly avoided committing U.S. combat troops to this effort...the U.S. is providing substantial military intelligence and transportation assistance. Unfortunately, the U.S. may very well be dragged into this against Clinton's efforts.

Further escalations -- and the final(??) resolution

• Exxon-Mobil indicated that if improvements in security continue at the current rate, that it would be possible to reopen the Arun natural gas plant in Aceh.

• Eight UN security experts are scheduled to visit West Timor to assess whether it is safe for UN humanitarian aid workers to return there. This is expected to start July 8, and last a week, including the cities of Kupang and Atambua.

• Indonesia's Energy Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro hoped that the security situation in Aceh would improve enough (later in June) to permit Exxon-Mobil's Arun Liquefied Natural Gas plant to reopen. Twenty-four Indonesian soldiers have been assigned to guard the plant.

• Exxon-Mobil announced that they were prepared to wait indefinitely for security considerations to improve before opening the gas fields in Aceh. One of the main issues was workers being able to go to and from work unhindered.

• Exxon-Mobil reported that about 11:15 PM local time at the Arun gas field, there was an exchange of gunfire. A fire within cluster four was discovered shortly thereafter, and was extinguished.

• Japan's Tohoku Electric Power Co Inc announced that if the Arun gas field shutdown continues into June 2001, that alternative measures for supplying the natural gas imports (510,000 tonnes/year) from Arun would have to be considered.

• Indonesia's chief politics and security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is concerned that Parliament's censure of Wahid, if pursued, could result in the demise of Indonesia as a nation.
• ExxonMobil has shut down most of its natural gas fields in Arun due to security threats. The only ones operating are offshore, north of Sumatra. It is unclear from whom the security threats are from. This puts at risk 3.4 million tonnes of Liquid Natural Gas exports to South Korea (out of project demand of 16.2 million tonnes). South Korea is seeking assistance from long-term suppliers, Australia, Taiwan, and Japan.

• Indonesian Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri toured Borneo today. The enhanced orders to Kalimantan police have successfully averted the need to declare a civil emergency.

• Kalimantan police have been ordered to shoot armed Dayak mobs on sight. This order (ten days after the start) appears to have been successful in suppressing the interethnic violence.

• Interethnic violence in Kalimantan (a province of Borneo) between the local Dayaks and relocated Madurese has claimed between 270 and 400 lives. It is unclear whether Wahid's interest in purifying his soul via the hajj is creating public relations problems for him in Indonesia. Police have not been systematically disarming the Dayak mobs.

• A mob of about 5,000 attacked a Golkar political office in Tuban (east Java). Local police did not admit immediate success in controlling the mob.

• Gene Frieda (4Cast economic consultants in Singapore) commented that there is a significant risk of Indonesia formally balkanizing. Currently, Megawati is supporting Wahid politically (against the Golkar faction in Parliament)

• The faction of the Free Papua Movement responsible for the current hostage incident with South Korean-owned plywood firm PT Korindo Merauke is down to three hostages now. An alternate demand (in place of the original?) may be holding discussions with Wahid.

• The faction of the Free Papua Movement responsible for the current hostage incident with South Korean-owned plywood firm PT Korindo Merauke does not appear interested in negotiations at all -- instead, five more were taken hostage. The current ethnicity count is thirteen Indonesian, and four South Korean. A priest is assumed to not be a hostage, although he is in the area (250 miles from the city of Merauke).

• Military spokesman Air Vice Marshall Graito Usodo indicated that while hardliners on both sides were still intent on creating trouble in the Moluccas islands, that it appeared that control could be maintained with only four battallions of troops and police, rather than the current seventeen. A gradual withdrawal (assuming no further complications) is currently planned.

• Irian Jayan separatists have taken twelve workers for South Korean-owned plywood firm PT Korindo Merauke hostage. This appears to be eleven Indonesians and one South Korean. The focus seems to be more compensation for logging operations than independence, however. This has been attributed to a faction of the Free Papua Movement, led by Willem Konde [alternate spelling: William Onde].
• Aceh health minister-in-exile Zaini Abdullah, speaking for the Free Aceh Movement from Stockholm, indicated that another attempt to require weapons to be turned in (nominal deadline circa Jan. 30, 2001; mentioned by Mahfud M.D.) was a provocation. There is no evidence that Indonesia can successfully implement this (cf. a recent failure [Oct. 2000] in West Timor)...and such a threat may be required of Mahfud M.D. in order for him to keep his position.

• Indonesia's defence minister Mahfud M.D., one day after a ceasefire extension took effect in Aceh, indicated that the local police were capable of handling the situation, and would call in the military if a military operation should prove necessary (contrary to expectations).
• The UN and Indonesia continue to have contrary opinion on whether Indonesia can implement a security guarantee for UN forces if they return to West Timor. Indonesia claims so, the UN denies it. There continue to be doubts about whether the Wahid government actually rules in West Timor.

• Separatist violence flared up in Aceh, leaving one policeman, one Aceh guerilla, and nine civilians dead. The Indonesian attempt at a cease-fire is due to expire Jan. 15, 2001 unless extended. It is unclear who was responsible for the nine civilian deaths.
• The Moslem bombers implicated in attacks in both Indonesia (apparently intended to destabilize the Wahid government) and the Philippines were trained in Afghanistan. The training time appears to be late 1980's or early 1990's...according to those caught and interrogated.

• A grenade was thrown from a passing car at the residence of the Indonesian governor of Aceh. Abdullah Puteh (the governor) and the national forestry minister escaped injury, and the damage to the residence was described as minor. Two were injured: a local official and his driver.

• Indonesian lawyers representing five former East Timor-based Indonesian police, including the former police chief for East Timor, are trying to block questioning by the Indonesian Attorney General's office because the results will be handed over to the UN investigation as well as the Indonesian investigation.
• Indonesian police have launched a manhunt for the coordinators of the prior day's assault on the police station. While formal liaison has not been invoked with Papau New Guinea, cooperation so far has been substantial.

• Almost 100 presumed-nationalist Irian Jayans were arrested after first attacking a police station, then damaging a nearby market. Two policemen were killed, and one civil servant.

• Isolated clashes between Aceh nationalists and the Indonesian military are not dying down quickly. They started on Dec. 4, 2000 -- the 24th anniversary of Aceh nationalists declaring political separation from Indonesia, in 1976. It is not clear how many died on Dec. 4: the reported range is 15 to 17.

• Papua New Guinea has augmented border controls with Irian Jaya following recent violent skirmishes (10 reported killed) between Indonesian police and Irian Jayan nationalists. This is currently an effort to deny Irian Jayan nationalists a base of guerilla warfare operations in Papua New Guinea.

• Indonesia has completely abandoned its Oct. 12, 2000 deadline for disarming the pro-Indonesia militias. This is inauspicious if the Wahid government actually wants IMF/World Bank aid.

• After 30 people were killed in Wamena town (Irian Jaya), thousands of pro-independence tribesmen retreated to the to jungle. Indonesian police were authorized to shoot on sight. The excuse for the riot was the removal by police of a pro-separatist "Morning Star" flag.

• Indonesia has arrested pro-Indonesia Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres on ill-specified weapons offenses. This is not expected to have any observable effect on Indonesia's "forcible disarmament" program.

• The "forcible disarmament" operation was said by Indonesia police spokesman Brigadier-General Dadang Garnida to have been extended to Oct. 12, 2000 on Sept. 27, 2000, due to the scale of the operation. The latest reported tally was: "50 factory-made guns, 1,300 home-made guns and 4,000 bullets". "Home-made guns" is problematic: there should be infrastructure to make more of those. The operation should be extended to suppress that infrastructure.

• The deployment of circa 400 police and circa 600 TNI has been sufficient to clear the armed pro-Indonesia militia from the East Timor refugee camps. This force is clearly too small to have any chance of even partial success, regardless of time allowed. I would be amazed if the Wahid government thinks this has any chance of satisfying international donors. I must raise the plausibility of the conspiracy-theorist hypothesis I mentioned on Sept. 10, 2000.

• Local police and military indicated that the forcible disarmament of the pro-Indonesia militias would start Sept. 28, 2000.

• The Jakarta government pledged to forcibly disarm the pro-Indonesia militia by Sept. 28, 2000. [Or is this a translation error? -- cf. September 27, 2000]
• In a demonstration of how little disarmament has been going on, the pro-Indonesia militias staged a riot at the police station in Atuamba, recovering (almost?) all of the weapons that had been turned in earlier.

• The Jakarta government's attempt to elicit a voluntary surrender has totally failed. The pro-Indonesia militia are not turning in anything modern, and have not turned in significant quantities of even WWII/Korean war era arms. [To wit: 34 automatic rifles, 9 grenade launchers, and circa 1,000 rounds of ammunition.]

• Udayana military commander Major-General Kiki Syahnakri reported that measures were needed to prevent foreign interference from provoking Irian Jaya to separating from Indonesia. He mentioned a "joint exercise by U.S, Singapore and Australian armed forces near the territory". [Incidentally, his command also includes West Timor, and included East Timor before the situation melted down.] However, this commentary was clearly not meant for international consumption. Neither Australia nor the U.S. have been involved in any joint exercises with anyone. [No report from Singapore....] [Perhaps there is some confusion with the UN?].
• The announced disarming schedule for the militia has been altered. The initial schedule has been declared to be a "persuasive" disarmament, followed by a presumably-indefinite "repressive" disarmament. However, local analysts have confirmed the international analysts: due to a faulty chain of command, the military in West Timor is not heeding orders from Jakarta reliably.

• Indonesia has finally announced a schedule for disarming the pro-Indonesia militia: Sept. 22-24, 2000. Indonesia refuses to accept UN verification, raising suspicions about whether this deadline is empty words or not. Red China appears willing to back up Indonesia's refusal.

• U.S. general Cohen made it very clear that Indonesia must choose between disarming the pro-Indonesia militia and international isolation. Cohen also noted that Indonesia's continuing failure to act on this constitutes deliberate reneging on a full-security pledge given to the UN for the attacked workers.

• The Wahid government continues to implement no visible action towards disarming/disbanding the pro-Indonesia militia, and is politically hostile towards any UN intervention to prompt such visible action. I empathize with Jakarta's nationalism, and wish they would align their words with their actions.

• I have reactivated the Indonesia situation as critical, due to several evidences that the Indonesian army in West Timor systematically ignores orders from Jakarta. This means that the Wahid government effectively does not exist in West Timor, indicating that Indonesia's de-empirization is potentially imminent again. An alternative interpretation (not plausible) is that the Wahid government is systematically misrepresenting its military orders to the UN. I will not reiterate this conspiracy-theorist hypothesis in future commentary.
  • September 6, 2000: Several thousand pro-Indonesia militia staged an organized attack on a UN aid compound, killing at least three UN workers and seriously injuring at least 32.
  • September 8, 2000: Wahid made the statement that the situation in West Timor was back under control. This statement was blatantly inaccurate: over 800 pro-Indonesia militia staged an attack on the village of Betun, leaving at least 20 dead. The U.S. military considered it very obvious that the Indonesian military was backing these attacks: that is, the Indonesian military in West Timor directly went counter to orders from Jakarta, so these orders either were not relayed or were directly disobeyed.
  • September 10, 2000: It was noted that the Jakarta government probably does not have the political will to disarm the pro-Indonesia militia.

• "It is finished!?" A general survey of the news since April 17 indicates that the Wahid government has successfully navigated the immediate crisis, and that what remains is mostly "routine" cleanup. While Indonesia will retain its red code for some time, I cheerfully remove it from my political instability tracking.
• The above was finalized by an Indonesian-Aceh truce that, while it locks out extremist factions' desires for independence, legalizes guerillas who wish to abandon their ways.
• While the Suharto corruption probe will continue for some time, it does not appear to be an index of political instability. Mass demonstrations on May 11, 2000 were shut down (compared to May 11, 1998 and May 11, 1999) because more effective methods of political activism are now in place. This is a very significant change, compared even to the elections for Wahid.
  • This is critical for Indonesia's stability -- because it is a serious convergence towards First World political methods. The U.S.A. is not a democracy because of its elections (formally, it is a republic), but because the U.S. government respectfully responds to its diverse populace. Most First World governments have been around long enough to develop a similar responsiveness, regardless of their exact governmental form.

• Indonesian prosecutors for the Suharto corruption probe were prevented from further inquiry today. Court-approved physicians ruled that it was medically unsafe for Suharto to be cross-examined.

• The Wahid government banned Suharto from leaving Jakarta. Indonesia has indicated that it is looking at a "truth and reconciliation commission", similar to South Africa's at the end of apartheid.

• A faction of Indonesian Moslems plans to declare jihad in the Moluccas islands if the inter-religious violence does not stop before then. This faction believes that they will easily get through Indonesia's blockade of the islands against them....

• Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, leader of the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor, was confident that his forces did not train the pro-Indonesia militia. This is consistent; those trainers who have been captured were from Kopassus, not the normal forces....

• Suharto answered the third legal summons -- in his home. He was able to answer simple questions fully, but the doctors (both for and not-for Suharto) were forced to interrupt the more complicated questions because of serious blood pressure surges. These answers (aside from the doctors' interference) were also fairly complete and informative.

• The Wahid government has pledged to remove the "extremist"(?) pro-Indonesia militia that are infiltrating from West Timor to East Timor.
• The resumption of military ties between the U.S. and Indonesia is now linked to the enforcement of accountability of Indonesia's military for the atrocities in East Timor.

• Suharto failed to appear for the second legal summons. A retry for early next week is planned.

• Suharto has been formally summoned (again) for questions about corruption in charities he once controlled.

• It seems that whether Suharto is medically fit to be questioned depends on who is paying the doctors doing the estimation.

• There are fears that the deadline of Jan. 1, 2001 for making various regions more autonomous could backfire due to lack of preparations. However, the deadline cannot be moved further into the future for political reasons. There are also fears that the various regions do not yet politically realize that they will be responsible for more government spending, as well as more money.

• President Wahid indicated that Indonesia must accept some of the blame for the situation in Aceh, and considers the rebel Acehnese political views to be reasonably grounded in past experience. Wahid also indicated that in case of a negotiated settlement to the issue, that various guerilla force members would be accepted into the Indonesian military.

• Indonesia is tightening security at the East/West Timor border, after four pro-Indonesia militia incursions (that involved firing at UN forces) occurred in 36 hours.

• Irian Jaya's governor estimates that keeping Irian Jaya in Indonesia will be much easier if the standard of living for those living there is significantly increased. An example is building a road between the major towns of Jayapura and Wamena: this would be much easier to accomplish if Jakarta's approval was not required for every single detail.

• General Wiranto, while testifying before legislators about East Timor, pointed out fourteen unauthorized Australian flights over East Timor in July and August 1999. He also believed not enough time was scheduled to let the voters fully understand the consequences of both options. The scale of the violence was completely unanticipated.

• President Wahid was temporarily pinned down in the governor's place at Dili (currently the working base for the UN administration) by an anti-Indonesian protest that Ramos-Horta did not approve of.
• General Wiranto, when testifying before legislators, reported that he had to shut down a 1998 coup attempt requested by Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono against Suharto. Yudhoyono is currently the minister of Mines and Energy in Wahid's Cabinet.

• Ryaas' plausibility estimate presumably has factored in a fairly outrageous draft autonomy bill for Aceh that "barely leaves Aceh in Jakarta's control". It is feared that any revision of the bill to make it less extreme could create (or reinforce) a deadlock.

• The current plausibility for Indonesia keeping Aceh is 90%, according to the regional autonomy minister Ryaas Rasyid.

• Wahid boosted the alert level for Jakarta security forces to red alert today, apparently having been informed of a "large protest" (not the anti-corruption one at the attorney general's office). He did not provide information about the organizers or focus. Either said protest was thoroughly deterred pre-emptively, or it never was planned: it didn't show up.
• The UN Security Council strongly urged Indonesia to proceed with its national investigation of East Timor, without overt reservations. There were no references to a UN tribunal (which both Red China and Russia are thought to unilaterally veto).

• Indonesia announced price rises for fuel (maximum 10%) and electricity (maximum 29%). There is a minimum wage increase (maximum 59%) planned for next month.

• A reunion of families split by the East Timor conflict appeared to be turning violent -- so the Indonesian military fired about 200 warning shots into the air. By Western standards, this was slightly excessive. The standards that count are the local ones -- and since further Western commentary seemed to be pure speculation, I'll assume Western media does not have access to key details that justify this.

• Suharto failed to show up for a congressional subpoena hearing. Some legislators decided that if Suharto could not come to the hearing, that the hearing would come to him -- but this was frustrated by considerations of medical care.

• Wahid said that the Indonesian East Timor trials would start in three months (May 2000) -- and that the UN had full rights to start an international tribunal if these trials are not started by then. One nameless commentator thinks that Red China (who has unilateral veto power) would shut down the international tribunal, however.
  • I'm not so confident of this: when a priority clash between stabilizing East Timor and preparing to invade Taiwan occurred recently, East Timor took precedence for Red China.

• While Wahid (back in January) has expected the problems in Aceh to be resolved by Mar. 2000, there has been no obvious progress since. The Acehnese blame this on Indonesia's failure to hold Indonesian soldiers legally responsible for various atrocities (similar to those in East Timor). I have no opinion on whether addressing this would actually improve the situation.

• Apparently, the current compromise between Wahid and Wiranto is that Wiranto keeps his position, but will be suspended during the investigation.

• Horta indicated that Wahid's guaranteed pardon of Wiranto in case of conviction was appropriate, since this is a presidential privilege -- and East Timor wants justice, not revenge. [Apparently, failure to pardon would exact revenge on top of justice....]
• Wiranto has announced that he wants to personally explain his position to Wahid before stepping down, and that he refuses to resign before a "fair legal process" has been attempted.
• Wahid (in South Korea to try to revive a national car project with Kia Motors) said that if Wiranto failed to step down voluntarily, it would endanger Indonesia's macroeconomic recovery. [This item is only approximately dated: it's somewhere between Feb. 9 and Feb. 14, inclusive].

• Laksamana Sukardi, Indonesia's State Enterprises and Investment Minister, said that the current conflict between Wahid and Wiranto is personal, and does not extend to the institutions that they represent.

• Wahid has openly mentioned that since the position of Chief of the Armed Forces deserves respect, that he will pardon General Wiranto if he is found guilty of East Timor-related charges.

• Wiranto's resignation has not been formally received yet. Wiranto says he needs a direct order from Wahid to resign, and that going through intermediaries won't work.
• Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that the continuing rumors of a (formal) coup in Indonesia are totally irrational. He cannot imagine how any military officer could believe a coup would permit an improvement in Indonesia's situation.
  • Alexander Downer said that Australia is in favor of Indonesia's territorial integrity, because Indonesia's breakup would worsen the security situation in all of Southeast Asia. [Piracy is an obvious issue: this has already been mentioned, on Nov. 28, 1999, by Sarwono....]

• Wahid has reconsidered the ideal timing of General Wiranto's resignation -- and has advanced it to today [Feb. 2, 2000]. Wahid plans to present this through the Minister of Defence.
  • Wahid's overt explanation for this change is to prevent unnecessary harassment by political opponents.
  • General Wiranto stated that he would not step down until Wahid's demand that he quit was clarified. He then proceeded to attend a regular Cabinet meeting on schedule. His lawyers will fight Indonesia's inquiry into the East Timor situation. There are some questions as to whether the summary forwarded to the Attorney-General censored out the military's testimony, and if so, why.
  • Amien Rais stated that this was not very rational, and that Wahid should have consulted with his advisers before changing the timing. Rais also stated that if Wahid is insufficiently decisive, Wahid's credibility will be damaged by the required compromise with the military. On the other hand, if there is actually sufficient evidence to warrant a trial of General Wiranto, then Wiranto would be forced to quit and stand trial.

• Indonesia's inquiry into the East Timor situation recommended that 33 people be investigated by Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman. General Wiranto, and five top Indonesian officers were named -- as were two leaders of anti-independence militia [Joao da Silva Tavares and Eurico Guterres] and East Timor's last governor under Indonesian rule [Abilio Soares]. General Wiranto was named for failing to take action after he knew about the violence.
  • Wahid plans to make a serious effort to block a UN international tribunal regarding East Timor. This commits Wahid to pushing through the prosecution of as many of the 33 named persons as possible -- in hopes of making the UN international tribunal irrelevant. Wahid planned to ask General Wiranto to resign his current position as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs when he got back (circa February 13, 2000).
• Amien Rais stated that if Aceh becomes independent, Indonesia will cease to exist.

• Army Chief of Staff General Tyasno Sudarto and overall military chief Admiral Widodo have both personally guaranteed there would not be a coup during Wahid's overseas trip. Apparently, the rumors that a coup is imminent are still circulating.
  • Cf. Dec. 6, 1999.

• Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab was of the opinion that dialogue would lead to a reasonable compromise with separatists in Aceh and elsewhere, citing that Indonesia would not tolerate separatism, but would consider greater autonomy.
• Dili (in East Timor) had the UN forces break up its third recent violent incident (involving about 200 people gathering around a house and stoning it). Thirty weapons were confiscated. An incident (on Jan. 15, 2000) involving 7,000 "job-seekers" minorly injured one UN soldier and a Portuguese cameraman.
• Pro-Jakarta militia are apparently trying to retake Oecussi, forcing an upgrade of the security requirements: all aid workers and UN liaison officers need armed escorts. At least one pro-Jakarta militiaman was killed on Jan. 18, 2000 by UN forces.

• Wahid openly dismissed rumors that a military coup was imminent. These rumors were started by an explicit warning by the U.S. State Department to Indonesia's generals not to conduct one. It seems there is ample reason to suspect a coup is imminent: both Wahid's refusal to declare martial law in Aceh, and current human rights investigations targeting top-level Indonesian generals, are creating stress between the Wahid government and the Indonesian military.
  • Cf. Dec. 6: in much of Indonesia, the coup has already happened....

• It is clear that Wahid will use force to prevent Moslems from answering the call to unholy war (or jihad, depending on one's political alignment). This isn't really a surprise: the Indonesian navy was already assigned the task of shutting down combatants traveling between islands in the Moluccas.

• Apparently, Moslem protesters have started calling for a holy war in Ambon. Among the Moslem clerics/Islamic scholars, there are two factions. Those agreeing with Wahid state that the protesters are calling for an unholy war, and that all who answer the call are sinning. The other faction wants the jihad. [This division applies to both Ambon and the Moluccas.] The Wahid faction would accept a jihad against those provoking the violence (probably Moslem!) -- but not against the Christians generally.

• Megawati (whom Wahid has delegated the responsibility for calming down the ethnic violence to) apparently has been sufficiently inactive that more drastic measures may be required. Some Moslem clerics i.e. Islamic scholars have declared a jihad against Ambon already (this contradicts Wahid, who is himself a Moslem cleric/Islamic scholar). [It depends: is the reporting agency Reuters or Xinhua?]
  • Megawati has a much better track record at inciting violence than conducting politics. As noted earlier, there is evidence that her vice-presidency was required to prevent an immediate civil war. Also, her political skills were proven incompetent in the campaigning from June 1999 to the elections in October 1999.

• It seems that ethnic/religious violence [Moslem vs. Christian] in the Moluccas islands has the potential to induce an ethnic/religious civil war in all of Indonesia. 80,000 Moslems rallied in Jakarta, and gave an ultimatum to Wahid: stop the violence in one month, or the Moslems will declare jihad in the Moluccas islands. [I'm not sure whether this is to be interpreted as February 4, 5, or 6.]
  • Indonesia's navy has imposed a blockade around the islands in an attempt to shut down militia (Moslem or Christian) travel between the islands. Confiscated weapons include firearms, ammuniton, swords, knives, spears, and improvised bombs.

• Pro-Indonesian militia troops were observed firing close to civilians near the West/East Timor border by UN-Australian troops, and attracted warning shots fired into the air. Neither side crossed the border, and no injuries were reported.

• Ramos-Horta has criticized the UN choices of Jordanian, Kenyan, and Pakistani troops in the next stage of the UN forces. While the former head of Indonesia's Kopassus forces, Prabowo Subianto, taking asylum in Jordan is interesting...I can think of much worse choices of troops. Thai troops, for instance.
• Ambon has regressed to (mostly) civil emergency -- the one thing lacking being the authorization of the military to impose a curfew.

• Wahid has declared that Indonesia will not recognize any international tribunal to try Indonesian generals for war crimes. If this stance continues, Indonesia may approach Serbia in political functioning.

• The UN investigation panel into human rights violations in East Timor has recommended to the UN Security Council that a war crimes tribunal be held. This is conditional on Indonesia failing to properly investigate its own generals within the next few months. Both the UN investigation panel, and the (Indonesian) Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Abuses in East Timor, recommend the immediate disbanding of the pro-Indonesian militia.
  • This last recommendation shouldn't happen: the authority to disband the militias is with the military coup government, not the civilian government....
• Admiral Widodo (current TNI armed forces chief) thinks there is substantial foreign interest in investing in Indonesia (particularly chemistry-based investing) -- but the current threat of Indonesia politically disintegrating under attacks by civilian militias on the government is preventing this investment from being made. He cites Aceh as an example.

• Juwono Sudarsono, the first civilian defense minister in nearly 50 years, does not want to prosecute Indonesian generals for atrocities committed by their troops. He also warned that while democracy exists at the national level, thousands of villages are under martial law already (the highest authority is an Indonesian NCO) -- and if democracy does not take hold within months, all of Indonesia could fall under martial law within months.
  • Members of the (Indonesian) National Commission on Human Rights disagreed with Juwono; Asmara Nababan pointed out that the Cabinet would make the decision to prosecute, not Juwono.
• The (Indonesian) Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Abuses in East Timor plans to summon the following Indonesian generals:
  • Wiranto (military commander and defence minister)
  • Adam Damiri (in charge of Indonesian troops before independence)
  • Zacky Anwar (former head of intelligence, part of a government body supervising the referendum)
  • Sjafrie Syamsuddin (military commander of Jakarta in May 1998, during the riots that toppled the Suharto government; seen at the Dili residence of Bishop Carlos Belo the day it was burned down (Sept. 6, 1999)
• Pro-Indonesian militias have been directly observed lying to East Timor refugees about the cost of medical care (it is free, but the militias claim the refugees must pay). Unfortunately, this clearly defines their spiritual alignment.

• Indonesia has obstructed the UN human rights investigation by denying visas to West Timor for the delegation until Dec. 2, 1999. Indonesia has also obstructed the gathering of evidence against Indonesian generals (including Wiranto).
  • Ramos-Horta [one of the East Timor independence activists] believes that a war crimes tribunal is completely avoidable, and can be headed off by dealing with the offending generals under Indonesian law.
• The pro-Indonesian militias and the Indonesian police are not controlled by the Wahid government at all in West Timor: they are directly opposing the implementation of the border accord that is to return East Timor refugees to East Timor from West Timor.

• Aceh's local Indonesian military commander Syarifudin Tippe has stated (to Reuters) that since the Wahid government has explicitly refused to impose martial law in Aceh, that most of Aceh is controlled by the Free Aceh rebel movement. That is, Tippe has grounds to believe that Aceh has already seceded.
• Great Britain has declared that it will pull out its Gurkha contingent from the UN East Timor force by Christmas. About one-third of this is expected to be pulled out by Dec. 9, 1999.

• The governor of Moluccas has requested a downgrade of Ambon's crisis status from martial law to a state of civil emergency. This was prompted by agreement between the military and the civilians that the military has not been able to prevent its soldiers from favoring Moslems in the clashes.
  • Ambon is subject to violent clashes fairly frequently. However, the downgrade request is interesting -- especially since it is the same kind of religious discrimination as was applied in East Timor [85% Roman Catholic].

• Indonesia's Minister for Maritime Exploration, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, has observed that an (Aceh-induced) breakup of Indonesia will cause the waters currently policed by Indonesia to become a haven for piracy.
  • This is a huge security risk for the entire region: several key sea trade routes would become highly dangerous to use.
  • Indonesia's instability has already been responsible for a rise in attempted (successful or not) pirate raids from 143 in Jan.-Sept. 1998 to 180 in Jan.-Sept. 1999. Of those in Jan.-Sept. 1999, more than 1/3 [that is, more than 60] took place in Indonesian waters.
  • Sarwono explicitly rejects the view (popular among legislators and government ministers) that Indonesia's breakup is being engineered by foreign powers -- because no nation would clearly benefit, economically or ideologically, from the breakup.
  • Sarwono does not agree with the 50% estimate of Aceh breaking away, as quoted earlier this month. He believes the chances are much lower, because Aceh does not have international support -- unlike East Timor.

• Coordinating welfare minister Hamzah Haz has resigned. This is reasonable, since he is high on Wahid's public list of officials to be investigated for corruption. Hamzah Haz was also a successful minister under Habibie.
• Wahid has indicated that the Aceh referendum will be over the introduction of Islamic sharia law, not independence. This makes December 4, 1999 an interesting date to watch.

• Thousands of ethnic Javanese [the majority ethnic group in Indonesia, overall] have fled Aceh in the past two days.
  • The Javanese were moved in to relieve population pressure on Java. This technique is historically very common when trying to solidify an empire; cf. the Babylonian and Roman empires.
  • The official count of those who fled is 5,000. The reduction in population is undoubtedly much higher, since several Javanese enclaves have been cleared by Free Aceh rebels in the past few days.
  • The Free Aceh rebels are rumored to have plans to initiate attacks on and/or around December 4, 1999, if President Wahid does not allow a referendum on independence. [December 4 is the founding day of the Free Aceh organization....]
  • The Indonesian military has stated that declaring martial law in Aceh may be appropriate.

• Wahid is offering a vote (probably on enhanced autonomy, not independence) to Aceh in about seven months.
  • The military will not tolerate an independence vote because that confirms the Balkanization process started in East Timor.
  • Amien Rais will tolerate an autonomy vote, but not now....
  • Wahid also wishes to push improved trade relations with Israel (but not actual diplomatic relations). Amien Rais thinks that this proposal itself requires full-blown crisis management, and should not be active while the Aceh situation needs action.

• Amien Rais has publicly estimated that if Aceh leaves Indonesia, that Indonesia "without doubt" will break up. Wahid is currently in the U.S. for medical treatment (didn't Suharto vacate office over a much more minor illness??)

• The Indonesian military has given its PR statement: secession from Indonesia is unconstitutional (and presumably will be resisted), even with approval from the People's Consultative Assembly. This implies that the Indonesian military is still planning how to recapture East Timor....

• Aceh was estimated today, by Indonesia's regional autonomy minister Ryaas Rasyid, as having a 50% chance (plausibility) of breaking away from Indonesia. I will assume that it is very unlikely that one of Aceh and Irian Jaya will break away, but not both. [Perhaps Aceh is testing the weakness of the Wahid Indonesian government for Irian Jaya?] Referring back to October 27, 1999: this translates into a 50% chance of Indonesia ceasing to be economically viable. A very bad situation for Indonesia, including Aceh and Irian Jaya.

• Cosgrove believes that the pro-Indonesian militia are still a threat, but that the Indonesian military is giving less assistance. In fact, he has reports that the Indonesian military are trying to prevent the militia from interfering with the resettlement of displaced East Timorese in East Timor. He continues to be frustrated at Indonesia's failure to cooperate with creating a proper border protocol.
• The UN has asked Indonesia to restrain the pro-Indonesian militia from such interference. [Of course, the militia are under the control of General Wiranto, not President Wahid -- but as observed above, General Wiranto apparently is at least partially cooperating with the UN.]

• Cosgrove has announced that about 10% of the population of East Timor is unaccounted for -- 80,000 to 130,000. 720,000 are accounted for. Most of this could be a counting problem.
  • It appears that the number of East Timorese murdered by pro-Indonesian militias is in the hundreds, rather than the thousands, however.
  • The most unstable number is the count of how many are in refugee camps in West Timor. No census has been taken, and the original Indonesian-government figure of 260,000 has already been revised downward to 225,000.
• I have finally gotten confirmation that General Wiranto's media description (on October 13, 1999) was indeed accurate. I find the delay highly annoying. [It suggests Western media censorship. This affects the analysis of the surprise information regarding the disapproval of the East Timor vote by Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly, on October 20, 1999.] Unfortunately, I do not have opportunity to directly apologize to General Wiranto.
  • However, it seems that the procedural steps required to prevent future incidents have not been taken to Cosgrove's satisfaction.

• Ramos-Horta has stated his opinions about the continued leadership of the UN force. Namely:
  • Malaysia is too closely aligned with Indonesia to be acceptable: massive civil disobedience could break out.
  • Australia is doing a good job (indicating that his biases will be diametrically opposite to Indonesia's. Australia's leadership is antagonizing Indonesia and angering Malaysia. Why is Malaysia responding more strongly than Indonesia?).
    • It is probably safe to say that anything Ramos-Horta likes, the Wahid government and Malaysia will hate.
  • South Korea would be acceptable in the later stages (UN administration).
  • Ramos-Horta was not recorded as commenting on Thailand (whom Wiranto would like). Note that I do not have an Indonesian source that wants Malaysia; Malaysia is merely volunteering without visible coordination with Indonesia.

• General Wiranto has stated that he would like Thailand to lead the UN force. I do not know why this story (initially on October 27, 1999) was worth repeating three days in a row. Considering other news stories that I have not directly commented on...I think there is strong evidence that Thailand would let the Indonesian military recapture East Timor with virtually no resistance.

• Wahid has constructed his cabinet by now. General Wiranto has been given what has been called a fairly minor position.
• The Wahid government is apparently desperate to try to hold Indonesia together. They are verbally willing to try to appease Aceh and Irian Jaya by granting greater autonomy (but not independence -- political poison in Jakarta).
  • I'd have to do some historical research...but I think this is an ineffective technique. Historically, separatist provinces try to separate when the empire-government is weak.
  • It is possible that Indonesia is not economically viable if too many provinces (such as both Aceh and Irian Jaya) are removed. At least, this has been mentioned as a possibility.
• One local commentator has analogized Indonesia's treatment of Aceh to Milosevic's treatment of Kosovo. If this analogy is correct, drastic action is required to prevent de-facto secession.

• The UN force is making progress on capturing the pro-Indonesian militia enclave of Oecussi in East Timor.
  • The pro-Indonesian militia is directly defying the People's Consultative Assembly declaration made on Octorer 20, 1999. This is further confirmation that they are not subject to the overt government in Jakarta [Wahid/Megawati].

• Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected vice president of Indonesia. While this option heads off the risk of 'instant civil war', it does nothing about merging the General Wiranto "stealth coup" government with the overt Indonesian government.

• Indonesia formally gave up its claim to East Timor today. However, the decision read: "The People's Consultative Assembly respects the results of the ballot in East Timor without setting aside the fact that the...agreement (to hold the ballot) was done by the government without permission from the House of Representatives."
  • This had not made it to me before. I have no idea whether this is a revisionist description, the point had never come up in the news before, or whether the Western media suppressed this fact since August 1999. All three options I named are plausible...and have very different implications. Any readers who have a better perspective on this (credibility clearly enhanced by being in Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore: my problem is being halfway across the Earth), please email me with your informed commentary now.
  • 'Lack of permission from the House of Representatives' is a procedural block that could have been used to prevent the East Timor elections regarding secession. Under most plausible scenarios, Habibie was even weaker than he appeared (from where I am) in August 1999.
• Election day! Due to the brilliant tactics by the phantom Golkar candidate, a very close vote between Megawati and Wahid ensued. Wahid barely pulled out ahead. Unfortunately, both candidates have deficiencies that could derail the Presidency:
  • Wahid is not exactly in good health. He is partly blind, dealing with the effects of a stroke, and requires assistance to sign documents. There is some question whether Wahid, or Wahid's handlers, will be the de facto president. Recall that Suharto resigned because of much less severe symptoms of this kind.
  • Megawati, on the other hand, has a serious tact deficiency. This first appeared in June 1999. There is also some question whether the faction of her supporters that plans to wage a violent revolution (due to the loss of the election!) is, or is not, large enough to be a serious national security threat....
  • The vice-president has yet to be chosen. Openly discussed choices include the chairman of the Golkar party, Akbar Tandjung; General Wiranto; and Megawati. herself.

• The Golkar party removed Habibie as their presidential candidate. With less than 48 hours before the election, they tried to field another presidential candidate (whose name I did not immediately record). This candidate made a smart tactical move: after realizing that in a three-way race Megawati was the clear winner, he refused to run and told his supporters to back the third contender, Wahid.

• Whatever the points in Habibie's speech were, they were not the right ones. Habibie is in imminent danger of losing the Golkar candidacy for President, with only one minority party in Parliament willing to accept the candidacy. [The story is unclear about whether Habibie's position itself is in imminent danger.]
  • "Only Allah knows" sounds unacceptable, to the world system, as part of an apology for permitting a political disaster (such as East Timor).
  • The anti-Suharto crowd has a grudge against him for being hand-picked by Suharto. [This crowd should also consider measures against General Wiranto, who is effectively implementing Suharto's intended policies regarding East Timor....]
  • The pro-Suharto crowd was angered by Habibie's inability to keep East Timor. This is also one of the Golkar party's problems with him.
  • Suharto-neutrals are not vocal, and are probably a remarkably small minority. At least, as far as can be determined, from half-way across the Earth, by dangerously incomplete media coverage.

• The Indonesian police proved unable to suppress a violent protest outside of Parliament preceding and during Habibie's speech to Parliament. The most effective protest control tactic reported was ensuring that Habibie's speech could be clearly heard by the protesters. (I do not have the background to recognize the important points in Habibie's speech, so I won't give details here.)

• What General Wiranto is telling the media (that the above policy has ceased) apparently is not the orders reaching the Indonesian military and militia in West Timor. Given the generally high level of cooperation between the Indonesian military, police, and (pro-Indonesian) militia, I would not bet on the veracity of General Wiranto's media line.
• General Wiranto still has not accepted the position of Vice President in Habibie's political campaign -- nor has he rejected it.

• The Indonesian army and militia have initiated a policy of starting clashes very close to the East Timor/West Timor border, in an effort to ensure that Indonesian casualties occur in West Timor.

• The New Zealand contingent of the UN forces have seized control of the airport near Suai.

• For the moment, 70% of East Timor is under UN control as of this date. Gun battles are expected to escalate as the UN forces actually take out pro-Indonesian militia i.e. Indonesian military bases.
• There is a question as to whether Red Chinese SKS rifles in use by the Indonesian militia/military are recently supplied, or have just been un-mothballed. In the absence of clear documentation, I am leaning towards the latter.

• The Habibie government has vehemently asserted that West Timor will not be a base of military operations against the UN force in East Timor. Unfortunately, the Habibie government doesn't have a military. The Wiranto government has (or is) the Indonesian military -- and has given no sign it is interested in a ceasefire.
• The Indonesian military command that used to be at Dili in East Timor is being relocated to West Flores near West Timor.

• The town of Suai [spelling as rendered by Reuters], in southwestern East Timor [near the border with West Timor] is apparently important enough for the pro-Indonesian militia i.e. Indonesian army to defend. At any rate, both UN forces and the militia are taking casualties in clashes around there.

• The Habibie government [the Wiranto government doesn't have the correct agencies to do this, yet] is openly supporting importers that are trying to find nonAustralian suppliers.
• The Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly has elected Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party as its speaker. Rais is a leader of a bloc of small parties called the Axis Front that could determine the outcome of the presidential race to be held in less than three weeks. This has been taken as a sign that proposed constitutional reforms are likely to make the position of speaker actually have political power [in contrast to the past few decades under Suharto and Sukarno].

• The British Gurkha delegation of the UN forces "crashed the party" on an Indonesian militia mass murder operation of 2,000 East Timorese. Of the twelve submachine-gun toting militiamen, three were captured. The Gurkhas fired some warning shots.

• If Indonesia's metaphor of a "ladder of tensions" (with Australia/Indonesia being currently at the topmost step) is easy to interpret: Indonesia is preparing to at least directly assault the UN force with the Indonesian military, if not invade Australia.

• The Australian commander of the UN forces has indicated that while his mandate is restricted to East Timor, the UN forces have been ordered to cross into Indonesia in hot pursuit. This was not taken kindly by either Indonesia or Malaysia.

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