There is nothing new about the situation the Bush administration
has gotten us into in Iraq. In fact, in a way this is a case of history
repeating itself. Forty years ago, when John Kennedy was president, the
democrats controlled congress and the white house, and the republicans
were the party on the outside looking in. Also, an ex-corporate executive
named Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense. Today, another ex-corporate
executive named Robert McNamara is Secretary of Defense. And, for some
reason, the Kennedy administration decided that a little nation in Southeast
Asia, called South Vietnam, had to be saved from the Communists. Today,
it’s the Republicans who control congress and the white house, and it’s
the democrats who are the party on the outside looking in. And, for some
reason the Bush administration convinced itself that Saddam Hussein was
sitting on scads and scads of weapons of mass destruction, so he had to
be removed from power. Why? To save us from the possibility of another
911 style attack. So, we launched an invasion, and after a brief war with
surprisingly little resistance, it was over (well mostly over). And, no
one could find the piles of weapons of mass destruction that Hussein was
supposed to be sitting on. Yet, the top people in the administration seemed
convinced that there had to be weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, somewhere.
So, what happened? Perhaps the Bush administration convinced itself that
Hussein had these weapons as a kind of mass delusion. Then again, perhaps
it was for about the same reasons that the Kennedy administration convinced
itself that South Vietnam had to be saved from the Communists, and got
the nation tangled up in a civil war in Southeast Asia. So, lets take a
look at what might have really caused this.
Political Alignments
Forty years ago the democrats controlled both Congress and the White
House. So there was no effective opposition voice to question the Kennedy
administration’s policies. No one in the congressional majority was likely
to go against their man in the white house out of party loyalty. Also,
because democratic leaders in the house and senate could punish dissent
in various ways. Next, the republicans were totally in the minority, so
they had no leverage, nothing to bargain with, when confronting the administration’s
policies. So, there was no effective voice of opposition to question the
policies coming out of the White House. Today, the situation is reversed.
The republicans control congress and there is a republican in the white
house. So, the situation is the same as it was forty years ago, only the
parties are reversed. Again, no one in the congressional majority is likely
to go against their man in the white house, and the minority is in no position
to effectively oppose those policies. Next, then as now, the nation was
involved in a conflict with an ideological movement that posed a severe
threat. Back then it was Communism, today it is Islamic Fundamentalism.
In both cases the enemies were real and dangerous, even if the fighting
was low key (this kind of conflict should be called this an un-war). So,
anyone voicing opposition to the administration’s policies had to walk
a fine line between patriotism and being called a “fellow traveler”. No
one in congress really wanted to oppose the un-war effort. So, then as
now, the situation is nearly the same. Back then, the enemies were the
communists who controlled the Soviet Union and Red China. Today, it’s the
Islamic militants in the mideast who are the enemies. So, then as now,
there was/is no effective opposition voice to question to the policies
coming out of the white house.
Personalities and Culture
Both today and forty years ago, the man running the Defense Department
came from corporate America. Robert McNamara came from the auto industry.
Before he was Secretary of Defense he was the CEO of Ford Motor Company.
Donald Rumsfeld came from the oil industry. I think both men were hard
driving executives. And, I think they could have brought their attitudes
with them, and that was a source of trouble. The problem is the way corporate
managers tend look at government workers. People from the upper echelons
of the corporations tend to see government workers as people who just couldn’t
quite make it in the “real world,” so they chose careers in government
instead instead. They chose nice cozy jobs in the federal bureaucracy where
they would be coddled and pampered by Mommy Washington. Even if the government
worker is a manager with thirty years of service, and a masters degree,
he is still someone who just couldn’t quite make it. Even if the worker
is a full general, who found time to get a doctorate, he is someone just
couldn’t quite cut it in the real world. Naturally, government workers
tend to resent being thought of in this way. And, this gets even worse
if the government worker is in the military. How many corporate types work
12 or 13 hour days Monday through Friday? That is what military people
do. How about a schedule like this? Get up in the morning at 5:00 AM for
an hour and a half of PT, change, shower, eat breakfast, go to work 9:00
AM, and finally get off at 5:00 PM. That is, assuming the unit is not in
the field, or doing some training (and that’s in peacetime!). How many
corporate types have to risk there lives training with some, frankly, dangerous
hardware. Military people do that all the time. Now, we rarely hear about
it when military people are injured or killed in “training accidents,”
but it happens on a fairly regular basis. Yet, these are supposed to be
people who just couldn’t quite make it in the “real world”. Now, the other
side of the problem is simply that a career in corporate management may
leave the executive unqualified to make the kinds of “life and death” decisions
that have to be made in the world of the military or foreign policy. Corporate
executives usually do not have to make decisions that put people’s lives
at risk, or cause mass destruction of property. There is a big difference
between the “dog eat dog” world of mergers and acquisitions and warfare.
So, an executive may not have the experience, knowledge, or even the ability
to understand, the meaning and consequences of the kinds of decisions military
people have to make (until awful things start happening that is). Taken
all together, a successful background in corporate management can be the
source of many problems in military leadership.
The Kennedy Administration and the Vietnam War
Robert McNamara came in as Secretary of Defense with the self appointed
mission of reforming the military. He wanted to make the pentagon more
efficient; according to the standards of big business. He was a disciple
of statistical analysis, numbers crunching, and game theory. But, he ended
up having to manage the war in Vietnam. So, he surrounded himself with
various experts, but had little time or patience for the officers serving
in the field, and would not listen to their advice. In several cases he
overruled his field commanders (from 5000 miles away), changing their plans
and orders to fit his (the experts) conception of how the war ought to
be waged (and lost). At least, this is what I think happened in Vietnam.
So, at the top there was Mr. McNamara and the professor of economics who
did his strategy. On the next level were the political appointees who enforced
his will. Below them there were the generals (who had all the knowledge
and experience) who were supposed to meekly carry out his will. But, “will”
is a funny thing. People live in groups and relate in terms of the group,
so very often my will is really our will. So, the political people at the
top, in a magnificent example of group think, collectively decided that
South Vietnam could be “saved” from the Communists by massive infusions
of American troops. The military officers who were supposed to carry out
those orders had no part in the creation of the policies, they were not
part of the group (they were people who just couldn’t quite cut it). Yet,
they were supposed to carry out the orders of those at the top (just like
at Ford Motors). These officers in many cases had served in Southeast Asia,
and understood the real situation. But, officers who objected to the policies
coming from down from the top (from McNamara and the economist who did
his strategy) were fired or demoted. Just like what happened people at
Ford who wouldn’t “go with the program”. Officers who went along with the
strategic wisdom coming down from the pentagon kept their careers. The
officers who kowtowed to the wisdom coming down from on high were promoted
(just like at Ford). The result of this was a strategy based on delusions,
a policy supported by lies, and a war that could not be won.
The Management Problem in Washington
I think the basic problem was that Robert McNamara was a good corporate
executive in water over his head. Statistical analysis, game theory, and
numbers crunching are all good things if you are a manager trying to maximize
the efficiency of a production line. But, war is chaotic. A battle is like
an avalanche. Once the rocks start moving you cannot always predict what
will happen next. So, you have to prepare for the possibilities. So, statistical
analysis and numbers crunching is of limited use in a battle. Things happen
too fast. However, statistical analysis and game theory may of help in
setting up the battle. Next, the way to win a war is to gain and hold ground.
To force the enemy into ever closer, and closer, corners. So, that in the
end he has no options but to submit. This has to be done on many levels.
Obviously there is gaining and holding real estate. But, also there is
politics (destroying an enemy’s alliances), morale (convincing an enemy’s
supporters that the war cannot be won), and other levels too. However,
if this cannot be done, then military force is not a good option, but a
desperate last resort. In Vietnam no one tried to gain and hold ground
consistently on any level. Perhaps the senior people in the administration
did not see that ground had to be gained, and held, to win. Then again,
they may have had little in the way of military knowledge, and may not
have known this. Lastly, there is the problem with trying to promote “efficiency”
in the military. In the business world efficiency the keys to winning the
competitive struggle. But, military organizations are outrageously wasteful
by design. Because a military unit has to stay functional even after losing
a third of it’s assets; that is the capability is what wins battles. But,
it makes the organization outrageously inefficient in terms of the business
world. Then again, corporate executives never have to plan for the purposeful
destruction of their assets. So, you cannot ask a military organization
to be efficient and expect it to win. In conclusion, Robert McNamara’s
concepts of management and authority were totally out of place in the military
environment. And, prejudice may have kept him from being able to talk with
the people who really knew what was happening. Finally, he may never had
the chance to learn the things he had to know as a commander in a war.
The Strategic Problem in Vietnam
The biggest policy failure in Vietnam was the inability to see that
the Soviet Union and Red China were becoming enemies, and what the ramifications
of that were. The Soviet Union and Red China were in a competitive struggle
to increase their influence in North Vietnam. The Soviet Union was trying
to surround Red China with a ring of client states. The Chinese were trying
to prevent this. That dropped the “threat” of communism in Southeast Asia
to almost nothing, because there were two competing communist movements.
For Ho Chi Minh (the North Vietnamese leader back then) that made things
very interesting. If he wanted something from the Russians, and they would
not give it to him. Then, he could go to the Chinese, who probably would
be generous to increase their influence. And, the Russians would have to
be generous also, to avoid losing influence. That meant North Vietnam had
an endless supply of military hardware; that they were able to acquire
for free. So, as long as the Russians and the Chinese were enemies, the
leaders of the north could go on fighting for as long as they wanted to.
And, there was nothing the politicians in Washington could do about it.
Now, partially this was due to policies that were put in place back when
Truman and Eisenhower were presidents. For example, Washington had ostracized
mainland China from the international community and the UN. So, President
Johnson could not go to the “Red Chinese” and make a deal (as President
Nixon later did). Part of this was pride and arrogance. They would have
lost to much “face” dealing with the Chinese, after the things they did
to ostracize China. Also, the leaders in Washington were terrified of public
opinion. So, they would not let the Navy close the harbors in the North
Vietnam to keep supplies from getting through (as Nixon later did). Nor
were they willing to let the Air Force deliver the kind of airborne terror
necessary to make the leaders of the north to negotiate seriously (again,
as Nixon later did). Now, part of this was a memory of the horrors the
United States and Great Britain inflicted on Germany and Japan in the Second
World War, and a desire that this not be repeated. But, they had no choice.
The nice options disappeared once they chose to commit US troops. So, they
got the nation stuck in a quagmire, and could not get out (without losing
face).
Was it Necessary?
I think the real kicker was that the Vietnam War was probably unnecessary.
First, Ho Chi Minh had been a US ally during the Second World War, and
he wanted to stay an ally after the war. But, Vietnam had been a French
colony before the war, and the French wanted things to go on that way after
the war. This invariably put the French in conflict with Ho Chi Minh. He
was a nationalist who wanted Vietnam’s independence, but also he was a
communist. So, the US ended up supporting France in it’s war in Vietnam,
and the French lost. As a result, Vietnam was divided into two nations
North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Perhaps the Truman administration could
have pressured the French to deal with the nationalists seriously? Second,
in the late fifties and early sixties President Diem of South Vietnam was
winning the war. But, he was a fanatic, and he was using brutal and cruel
methods. The leaders in Washington (fearful of the public opinion perhaps)
supported a military coup against him. The coup turned bloody and resulted
in his murder (interestingly, President Kennedy was killed only about a
week after that). Afterward, the military situation in the south collapsed.
Perhaps this was due to the fact that there was no popular support for
the new dictator. Or, perhaps it was due to the limited intellectual caliber
of leadership that replaced Diem. So, what if Washington had sent Diem
lots of weapons instead supporting the assassins or sending troops? This
was the strategy that worked in the conflicts of the 1970’s and 80’s. This
policy might have stalemated the war, and a negotiated settlement might
eventually have been possible. However, the basic problem was that the
leaders in Washington would not listen to those who had experience in the
region, and they were just too afraid of public opinion. They were not
willing to listen to things they did not want to hear, or do the things
that might have worked, and the result was a disaster.
Now, What About Iraq?
The Bush administration convinced itself that Saddam Hussein was hiding
piles and piles of weapons of mass destruction, and that he was trying
to get even more weapons. Why did the administration convince itself of
this? Well, if those at the top were convinced that Hussein did have chemical
agents, toxins, and other illicit deadlies (in spite of the negative results
from the UN inspections) it could have happened this way. They could have
asked for proof from the intelligence agencies, and quietly let it be known
that negative results would not be acceptable. That negative results might
have negative career consequences for those involved. So, the analysts
working for the intelligence agencies had to prove that Saddam Hussein
was sitting on piles and piles of illicit weapons. Now, this could happen
even without the people at the top saying anything overt about negative
consequences. The system is a hierarchy of political appointees and various
administrators, and their actions are not necessarily controlled by their
superiors. But, when the big bulls decide to move, the herd follows. The
best followers are promoted, the laggards are demoted; and the laggards
bosses can suffer negative consequences too. So, it is in the interest
of the appointee’s that everyone “gets with the program,” and that those
who don’t are punished. And, this can happen regardless of what those at
the top really want. So, regardless of what those at the top think about
honesty, the people at the bottom can be punished for not “going with the
program.” And, when those at the top began to demand proof that Saddam
Hussein had illicit weapons, those at the bottom complied (and kept their
jobs). And, the administration had the proof they wanted.
Once the administration the necessary proof about the Hussein regime, they acted. There was a build up, an ultimatum, and an invasion. Then, low and behold, the Iraqi regime collapsed almost without a fight, and afterwards no one could find any weapons of mass destruction (well almost none, see below). Why? It was Vietnam syndrome all over again. A few people at the top were convinced of the facts, and demanded that the system prove it. The system gave them what they wanted. Partially, this was due to frustration over the unwinnable un-war President Bush (senior) started when he didn’t finish off Saddam Hussein after Desert Storm in 1991; and that President Clinton continued during his administration. Understand, the top people in the current Bush administration were the folks who, during the Reagan administration, armed Saddam Hussein so that he could continue his war with Iran (and organized support for the Nicaraguan Countras, and supplied the fighters in Afghanistan in their war against the Soviet Union). Back in those days the fear was that the mideast would fall to Khomeini style Islamic fundamentalists or become Soviet puppets. As a result, the oil fields of the mideast would end up in the hands of very unfriendly people. So, the leaders in Washington were willing to support anyone, anyone, to prevent this. So, the senior people in the administration might have had reasons think that Saddam Hussein held on to at least some of the weapons they helped give him. And, given the behavior of his regime towards the UN weapons inspectors, and the unwinnable un-war between the US and Iraq, this was probably a reasonable assumption. The rest was a repeat of Vietnam syndrome.
Did the Iraqis have Weapons of Mass Destruction?
I think the answer is yes and no. First, Iraq has a lot of uninhabited
desert. It would not be too difficult to wrap various deadlies plastic
and bury them for later recovery. Saddam Hussein could have had a lot of
stuff saved this way for a rainy day. But, when, or even if, this stuff
ever turns up is problematic. We don’t even know if the stuff was buried.
Then again, there are other ways to have weapons of mass destruction. For
example, empty chemical shells were found near an insecticide factory.
Some military nerve agents are chemically fairly close to insecticides.
So, perhaps the insecticide plant could have been turning out nerve agents
on short notice, with a few modifications. Again, US inspectors did find
those mobile research vans that the Hussein regime was supposed to be using
to develop biological agents; abandoned, but well sanitized. But, they
did not find any delivery systems for biological agents. However, sophisticated
delivery systems may not be needed. These things can be sent by mail (anthrax
style), or by courier (a la suicide bomber). Again, there were the nuclear
components found buried in the Iraqi scientist’s back yard. And, there
were other some things too. So, I guess the truth is that Saddam Hussein
wanted to develop these weapons. But, that the UN inspections put limits
on what his regime could do, and the rest had to be done covertly.
Was it a Bluff?
R. James Woolsey, President Clinton’s first CIA director, put an interesting
spin on the administrations response to Iraq in a recent essay. He suggested
that Saddam Hussein had been telling his generals that he had weapons of
mass destruction, but this was a lie to reassure them. Now, each general
knew, personally, that he did not control any WMD’s. But, in the environment
of secrecy, the generals could not ask other generals if they controlled
WMD’s. So, they were (supposedly) reassured by Saddam’s lie that they had
dangerous weapons to use if the worst happened. Now, what if the NSA or
the CIA picked up a few of these conversations? What if Saddam Hussein
knew, or suspected, that US intelligence agencies were capable of listening
in, and intended this as a bluff? If so, he severely miscalculated the
American response, post 911. So, those lies could have gone a long way
towards convincing the administration that Saddam Hussein did have WMD’s,
and intended to get more. The rest was a case of various political appointees
putting muscle on intelligence analysts to come up with “proof” that the
Iraqi’s actually did have the stuff.
A Personal Note
I have yet to hear anyone in the administration give what is probably
the most logical reason for not finding WMD’s in Iraq. That this was mostly
a bluff on the part of Saddam Hussein. Think about it. Hussein was in danger
of losing his grip on power. The easiest way for him to cow his opponents
and stay in power, was to appear as the meanest, maddest, insanest, most
dangerous man in the whole Middle East. So, playing as if he was hiding
weapons of mass destruction made sense. Because that meant people would
think he had poison gas to use on his domestic opponents. Also, it was
an implicit threat should the administration in Washington start thinking
of intervention. It worked with the Clinton administration. But, with the
Bush administration it backfired totally, due to fears of another 911 attack.
Well, not really totally. Saddam Hussein would have lost everything in
a political coup, including his life. And, his family would have lost everything
too, including their lives. The invasion put an end to this possibility.
Now, Hussein did lose his two sons and his freedom, but his family is safe
and will probably be able to hang on to their money and property (not to
mention their lives). So, in a strange way, even the invasion was a lesser
evil. Now, I have been hoping that President Bush (or someone else in the
administration) would be willing to say the things most likely to put this
behind him. That this started as a bluff on the part of Saddam Hussein.
That Iraqi exiles were trying to curry favor with the administration by
telling them the things they wanted to hear. And, the rest was the result
of bureaucratic paranoia in action. This is the most face saving way for
the administration to put Iraq behind it.
The Problem with Political Appointees
A political appointee is a special kind of politician, not a civil
servant. And, like all American politicians, an appointee is a special
kind of entrepreneur. That is, a businessman in business for himself, in
military terms a mercenary. The big difference is that instead of being
elected, he is appointed by other politicians. Now, like any politician,
an appointee advances his career by being (at least seen
as) successful, by
scoring big, by wining the big victory. And, it is interesting to
look at the lengths appointees will go to do this. Next, the other difference
is that the political party has little or no influence in the world of
the appointees. Appointees are supposed to be appointed by the president
(with the advice and consent of the Congress for senior appointees). And,
the appointee is supposed to be answerable to his boss in the hierarchy.
Usually this is another appointee (and in many cases it’s the appointees
boss who made the recommendation that got the job). But, the boss may not
be able to control the appointee, or fire the appointee, short of taking
the issue up the hierarchy to the President (this is the government after
all). So, an appointee is in it for himself, and all the other appointees
are, in one way or another, competitors. And, if the appointees boss is
also an appointee, that makes for an interesting problem. Because the boss
is also a competitor, and a threat to the appointee’s political career.
Everyone is a competitor and everyone has to protect his turf. That is
why you see appointee hierarchies getting into arguments about rules, regulations,
and uniforms. The appointees are acting like birds, squawking to proclaim
their territories. But, if anyone asks why? They blame it on the civil
service bureaucrats (that they are supposed to control). However, there
can be temporary alliances based on mutually profitable goals. So, you
see cooperation mixed with continual arguments and occasional back stabbing.
And, getting anything out of an appointee hierarchy requires a great deal
of political skill. That is the way of the appointee hierarchies. But,
this is a special problem when it comes to military affairs, or foreign
policy. Because appointee’s are not necessarily qualified for their jobs.
The appointments are based on friendships and political loyalty. So, where
did our ideas about appointee hierarchies and the bureaucracy come from?
A Necessary Digression, Big Business Bureaucracy
Our theory of government bureaucracy is based on big business bureaucracies.
That is, on big business as it was back in the 1920’s and earlier. To understand
government bureaucracies, we have to understand how big business bureaucracies
worked in the days before the digital computer. Back in those days it took
thousands of people to run a large corporation. Consider the accounting
tasks involved in managing a payroll in the days before the computer. Someone
had to manually write out all those checks. Also, those were the days of
the big time capitalists. Back then, large businesses were owned, and run,
by a small elite of incredibly wealthy capitalists. Today’s corporations
owned the thousands of shareholders, who elect the board of directors (based
on expected profits). Back in those days things worked this way. At the
top there was the big tycoon; Mr. Ford, or Mr. Rockefeller. Below the big
tycoon, there were the executives who ran various aspects of the company.
Under the executives there was the company bureaucracy. The hordes of functionaries
who processed data (manually, there were no computers back then) and made
the company run smoothly. And, below the bureaucracy were the workers who
did things to make the company profitable. At the top, the executives formed
a kind of oriental court around the tycoon. They controlled who went in
to see the Grand Puba, and who’s memos reached the Grand Puba’s desk. This
worked because the organization had a central focus, making money. Those
who increased the company’s profits were promoted, those who decreased
profits lost their jobs. This was a dictatorship, and there was no mercy.
Workers danced to the Grand Puba’s tune, or else. So, these firms ran on
a fairly efficient basis. Also, businesses back then tended to have a central
focus. You did not see corporations trying to get into all sorts of businesses
and become conglomerates. Instead, each company had a central focus and
tried to stay there. So, Sears, Roebuck, and Company was into mass marketing.
Ford Motor Company made automobiles. General Electric made electronics.
And, Bethlehem Steel made steel. This narrow focus meant that the businesses
could be wrapped around the most efficient modes of operation. For example,
Ford built a huge integrated manufacturing plant at the River Rouge, in
Michigan. This maximized efficiency, and enabled Ford
to dominate
the auto business in the late 1920’s. So, the big business bureaucracies
of those times were absolute tyrannies under the control of a small group
of executives, and were limited to only a few organizational objectives.
But, when this model was applied to government there were serious problems.
Because government is non profit and has to deal with a wide range of conflicting
issues, not a few simple objectives. So, the big business model had to
fail.
The Basis of the Problem
Back in the glory days of big business, more then a century ago, people
were impressed with the efficiency of the large capitalist enterprises.
Organizations like United States Steel were considered models of efficient
organization. And, while these organizations had many problems, people
began to think that the “big business” model could
be applied
to other kinds of organizations, and to situations almost totally
foreign to capitalist enterprise. People thought they could apply the “lessons”
of the big business style of management to public business. But, there
were several problems with this kind of thinking that were not apparent,
because they were looking at the glory of big business, not the reality
of government. So, what was wrong with the big business model of bureaucracy?
The first problem was simply that government is a nonprofit business. There is no profit motive to keep people efficient. At the top people are motivated by political ends. At the bottom people are working for a salary (and sometimes trying to do as little as possible). That means that other incentives have to be used to keep people working efficiently. But, these kinds of incentives are foreign to big business. In fact, they are not needed. The promise of promotions and raises for diligent service, combined with the threat of demotion or being fired, are usually enough in the business world. This works because there is a standard to judge things by, the profit margin. But, government is a nonprofit enterprise, so there is no profit margin. There have to be other incentives to promote efficiency.
The second problem is that there have to be limits on what politicians can ask government workers to do. For example, what if government workers were required to work for political campaigns? What if government workers were required to give campaign contributions to the politicians in power? What if applicants for government jobs were required to provide political credentials as a condition of employment? All of these things happened, right here in America. It was called the spoils system. It finally ended in 1881, when Charles Guiteau, an unsuccessful applicant for a federal job, shot and killed James Garfield, the President of the United States. A few years later Congress passed the Pendleton Civil Service Act. This created an apolitical civil service based on competitive examinations rather then campaign contributions.
The third problem is that the government bureaucracy is not, and cannot be, a tyranny for those who work there. That is, if you want it to actually work, and not sink into a sea of corruption. Because, there have to be limits on the ways politicians can punish civil servants, to keep the civil service apolitical (see above for reasons). So, there have to be other methods to enforce the standards of the civil service.
The forth problem is that business bureaucracies were designed for a narrow focus on limited objectives. The government, on the other hand, has to manage a wide range of things across a broad range of objectives. But, the big business model, when applied to the government, invariably creates a big centralized bureaucracy run by a horde of political appointees, from the top. If the appointees are more interested in competing with each other the doing their jobs (as is usually the case), you get agencies bogged down in arguments about regulations, procedures, and uniforms. And, if a senior appointee is a political activist it gets even worse. The result is that the bureaucracy that is too far away from the things it is supposed to manage. Power tends to be concentrated at the top with the senior political appointees. Who, generally do not want to delegate things to the junior political appointees who are supposed to be their subordinates, but who are actually their competitors. So, the system is usually too far away from the things it is supposed to manage, and too caught up in internal arguments and control issues, to do anything.
The Legal Source of the Problem (at least in the military)
It wasn’t always this way, political appointees running amuck, and
harming the nation’s security and reputation. There was a time when this
sort of thing was a lot less likely. I think this problem was created by
the National Security Act of 1947. This act put the armed services under
a single secretary of defense, and put civilian political appointees in
the chain of command. Before the act, civilians appointees could not be
in the military chain of command. There was the President, the commander
in chief, and below him were the generals and admirals. The service secretaries
were administrators who worked on the civilian side, and did not have the
authority to give orders to the military. So, if a civilian political appointee
wanted a general to do something he had to ask politely, or go see the
President. This system created two factions around the president, the appointee
hierarchy and the military hierarchy. This had three results. First, important
things had to go through the oval office. If an appointee wanted something
from a general, he had go through the President. If a general wanted something
from a civilian, he had to go through the president. This meant that uncontrolled,
run amuck, situations were a lot less likely. Second, the two sides were
able to watchdog each other, because they were competitors. Third, this
resulted in a creative conflict between the two factions, because there
had to be a consensus between the two sides to have an effective policy.
This brought out the best characteristics of both sides. On the one side,
the civilian appointees were generally more capable of “out of the box”
creative thinking. On the other side, the military professionals had the
experience, and knew what the real costs and consequences were. So, good
policies could be forged out of the conflict between the two factions.
And, wacky ideas had a hard time surviving in this environment of creative
tension. Then, Congress decided to apply the big business model to the
military.
If you look at world before 1947, and the passage of the National Security Act, the United States almost never lost it’s wars. After the National Security Act the United States had a hard time winning anything. What you see is a nearly constant record of defeats and stalemates. Why? First, because the National Security Act cut the people who knew what was going on out of the decision making process by putting several layers of political insulation between the President and the experience of the military professionals. This was in the form of a political appointee hierarchy; under secretaries of this, sub-under secretaries of that, sub-sub-under secretaries of whatever else. To keep their jobs, military professionals had to kowtow to the senior political appointees, and to advance they had to behave like political appointees. So, if a senior appointee had a wacky idea, there was little to keep it from becoming policy. For example, back in 1985 a senior political appointee named Robert McFarlane, then the head of the National Security Council, got the funny idea that there might actually be “moderates” in the fundamentalist Islamic regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. And, that the US should sell weapons to that regime to aid it in it’s war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Because that would give the “moderates” a greater position of power in the Iranian regime. Also, that the “moderates” would somehow prod the Shiite militias in Lebanon to release the US citizens they were holding hostage. Then, McFarlane got another civilian political appointee, William Casey, then the CIA director, to come on board. And, they got two military people, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Rear Admiral John Poindexter, to join them. So, in spit of the fact that this went against the stated US policy of neutrality in the gulf war, and violated several laws, North and Poindexter were sent to Iran to make a deal with the “moderates”. Later, North got the idea that the proceeds from the sales should go to support the Nicaraguan Countras, a guerrilla force the Reagan administration was supporting in an effort to topple the leftist Sandinista regime then in power in Nicaragua. This was also illegal. As it turned out, the “moderates” were not really all that moderate, and the secret deals became an open scandal. The rest of this is known as the Iran-Countra Scandal. And, it severely hurt the Reagan administration. But, the big unanswered question was this, how much did President Reagan know about it? Was this the result of a policy decision coming from the oval office, or was this just another case of civilian political appointees running amuck? However, the unnoticed point is even more interesting. There was no way the military chain of command could control Poindexter and North under the system created by the National Security Act. These two were under the control of civilian politicians, acting as mercenaries, under the orders of other mercenaries. Under the old system the senior political appointees would have had to go through the white house and the military chain of command. The president would have known. And, the activities of North and Poindexter would have been under the control, because they would have been answerable to the chain of command. So, there would have been no questions about who knew what, and when, and who didn’t, because the old system forced accountability.
Why was the old military hierarchy set up the way it was?
I think the old system came about because the founding fathers had
really studied history. Back in those days, a well off “gentleman” was
supposed to be well educated. Wealthy families would hire tutors for their
children, and expect them to learn subjects that today would be relegated
to the “Liberal Arts”. So, children were taught classical history (the
history of ancient Greece and Rome). Now, the military leaders of ancient
Greece and Rome were often elected politicians. That’s right, generals
had to run for office. And, sometimes this lead to disaster. The problem
was that military experience was not necessarily what got the politician
elected. If the politician was smart he would appoint a hard nosed professional
soldier as his lieutenant, then do whatever the fellow told him to. But,
in some cases the politician got the idea that he was a military genius.
So, off he went to battle the barbarians with his public relations man,
Major Spinicus, and his strategist, Colonel Polltakicus. Off to win the
war, and advance his party in the next election. This often resulted in
disaster. So, when the founding fathers were setting things up, they made
it a rule that no civilian politician or appointee could be in the chain
of command. If you wanted to order soldiers around, you had to swear the
oath, put on the uniform, and live under military law. Now, sometimes things
broke down. For example, during the Civil War politicians did get themselves
commissions as officers, and many interesting things (and a few disasters)
happened. But, the higher commanders were men who came through West Point,
and they were able to control the worst abuses. So, the old system usually
worked. The reason it worked was that it forced accountability, fostered
an atmosphere of creative tension between the political appointees and
the generals, and tended to force critical thinking. So, in this system
a fairly rational consensus could be reached on most issues. As a result,
the US rarely lost battles and hardly ever lost wars, at least before 1947.
Finally
I can see it now. Come the next election the democrats will have a
one word answer for anything President Bush or his supporters say, “Liar!,
Liar!”. I can hear it now, “Liar!” But, was Mr. Bush a liar? Or, just the
victim of an out of control political bureaucracy? How could the administration
prove
that Hussein had, or didn’t have WMD’s? In the convoluted environment
of the political appointee hierarchy, proving anything can be very difficult.
An Afterthought
On a deeper level this essay is about human institutions and inhuman
institutions. About institutions that worked because they denied human
nature (in one way or another). And, about institutions that failed because
they followed human nature too closely. I think there are a few paradoxes
hiding here. For example, there is the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church
is the only religious institution on the planet that is also a nation state,
Vatican City, and a member of the United Nations. So, why was the church
so successful for so long? Perhaps the reason is celibacy. The church has
always been run by celibate priests, nuns, and monks. People who were supposed
to totally deny their natural sexual desires, and put the energy that would
have normally gone into having a wife and family into a religious institution.
Because of this the Church has been going strong for almost 2000 years.
But, celibacy may also be the church’s greatest problem. Think about the
recent sex scandals in the church. Actually there is a long history of
this sort of thing. All the result of unfulfilled sexual desire. Because
the release that would normally come from relations with a woman is not
available to a priest. So, some priests seek less legitimate forms of release.
Conclusion, celibacy is the reason the church has worked so well for so
long, and it’s greatest
downfall.
Now, what about things in Washington? Celibacy is a long way from the interests
of the political appointee hierarchy. But, the Catholic Church is
also a hierarchy. A hierarchy filled with celibate priests, monks, and
nuns. A hierarchy that has worked for hundreds of years because it was
staffed by people who set out to deny their natural human desires. Political
appointees are human beings following their natural desires. Perhaps following
our natural desires, to dominate, to set up ape-like hierarchies, can make
institutions almost totally dysfunctional. It may be that the natural human
desires, to lust, to profit, to dominate, and even to survive, can be the
downfall of institutions if followed. The old military system worked because
it kept human nature in check. It did this by using natural human rivalries
to foster a creative tension. The new military system failed because it
was based on the big business bureaucracy. A place where human nature could
run amuck. Because the controls that exist in a business environment do
not exist in government. That is what this essay is really about.
I hope you enjoyed reading this.
Big Business vs. The Corporation
What finally happened to the big business model was that it failed
when it came up against a new kind of economic institution, the modern
corporation. The reason was simply that corporate executives were elected
by the stockholders, and had to please the stock holders to keep on being
an executives. That meant the corporations were more efficient and more
ruthless then the old capitalist enterprises. A good example is how Ford
Motor Company failed to compete successfully with General Motors Corporation.
In 1929 Ford was the largest auto company in the United States. In 1940
it was number two, after having lost millions of dollars in the great depression.
General Motors, in contrast, made at least a small profit every year of
that decade. So, Ford Motor Company had to become a corporation too, or
go out of business. <return>
Big Business and the Public
Schools
A good example of this is what happened when the big business model
was applied to the public schools. In less then a century the United States
went from having the greatest system of public schools in the developed
world, to having one of the worst. I think this was largely because big
business management techniques were imposed in an arena where they could
not work. The big business model assumes that the person at the top is
managing people, or doing highly intelligent work. And, the people at the
bottom are doing less intelligent work. Things like peeling potatoes, shoveling
coal, digging ditches, or putting widget “A” into stud “B” on a production
line. However, in a public school the most intelligent “work” is done by
the teachers in the first, second, and third grades. The intelligence required
here is not really academic (college level stuff about math and hard science),
but more psychological and developmental. So, our normal ideas about big
business hierarchies fail because elementary school teachers are supposed
to be nearly at the bottom of the ladder, just above the sanitation engineers
(a.k.a. Janitors). That means teachers are overworked, underpaid, and usually
misunderstood. Also, the people at the top are supposed to “know” more
then the people at the bottom. But, elementary school teacher knowledge
is esoteric and experiential, and mostly useless outside a classroom. So,
the people working in the offices upstairs don’t have to know this kind
of stuff to do their jobs. But, they are supposed to be the people who’s
“job” is to tell teachers how to do their jobs. Jobs they may not understand
because they may never have had the opportunity to go out to an elementary
school and teach. Also, education is based on a relationship between teacher
and student. Not on any textbook or program. The hierarchy can buy textbooks
and fund programs, but it cannot build relationships. Conclusion, there
is very little the public school hierarchy can do to improve elementary
education, but there is an awful lot it can do to destroy it. So, un-education
is often the outcome. <return>
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20 December 2003 - 17 March 2004